War, Political Survival and the Political Economy of Violence in the Middle East

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Militarisation, Authoritarian Power, Financial Incentives, and the Human Cost of Prolonged Conflict

Abstract

The persistence of political violence in the Middle East raises a fundamental humanitarian and political question: to what extent can the political survival of authoritarian, populist, nationalist, or religiously oriented leaders become structurally connected to the continuation of military confrontation? This article examines the hypothesis that, in political systems where leaders derive legitimacy from permanent insecurity, national mobilisation, religious polarisation, or external confrontation, peace and comprehensive social welfare may constitute a political challenge rather than merely a humanitarian objective. The argument does not claim that every regional leader consciously creates war solely for personal enrichment or political survival. Rather, it proposes that political systems can develop incentives in which prolonged conflict strengthens executive power, suppresses political opposition, redirects public attention away from domestic failures, expands security institutions, and generates economic opportunities for state-linked actors.

The cases of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Benjamin Netanyahu, Mohammed bin Salman, and Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Julani), among others, illustrate different forms of political power and should not be treated as identical phenomena. Nevertheless, their respective political environments demonstrate the importance of examining the relationship between militarisation, religious or ideological mobilisation, executive power, and regional conflict. The article further examines the effects of war on global financial markets, particularly oil, metals, currencies, equities, and risk premiums. The central humanitarian proposition is straightforward: when populations achieve durable security, economic stability, political rights, and social welfare, the political utility of fear and military confrontation diminishes. In such circumstances, leaders who depend upon permanent conflict lose one of their most powerful instruments of political mobilisation.

Keywords: Middle East, political violence, authoritarianism, militarisation, political economy of war, religious extremism, oil markets, financial markets, human security, international criminal law, political legitimacy.

1. Introduction

The modern history of the Middle East demonstrates that war is rarely confined to the battlefield. Armed conflict transforms political institutions, economic structures, social relationships, international alliances, commodity markets, currencies, and the everyday lives of ordinary people. The consequences therefore extend far beyond the immediate destruction caused by bombs, missiles, artillery, displacement, and military operations.

A central question consequently emerges: who benefits politically and economically when societies remain permanently insecure?

This question should not be reduced to a simplistic conspiracy theory in which every war is deliberately manufactured by a single leader for personal profit. Political conflicts have complex causes, including territorial disputes, historical grievances, ideological divisions, state interests, external intervention, security dilemmas, institutional weakness, and competition among regional and global powers. Nevertheless, once violence begins, political and economic structures can develop incentives that make the continuation of conflict advantageous to particular elites, institutions, industries, and political movements.

This is particularly important in political systems in which leaders derive legitimacy from presenting themselves as indispensable protectors of the nation, religion, ethnic community, state, or civilisation. In such circumstances, the existence of an external enemy can become politically valuable.

A population living in fear is more likely to tolerate extraordinary security measures. A population facing an existential threat may accept restrictions that would otherwise be politically unacceptable. Political opposition can be portrayed as disloyalty. Military expenditure can be justified as unavoidable. Economic failures can be attributed to sanctions or war. And political leaders can present themselves as the only individuals capable of protecting society from catastrophe.

Thus, the political economy of prolonged conflict deserves to be examined not only through the question of who started a war, but also through the question of which political structures acquire greater power from its continuation.

2. The Political Utility of Permanent Insecurity

One of the most important mechanisms connecting conflict with political survival is the creation of a permanent state of insecurity.

A democratic society normally evaluates political leadership through questions such as:

• Has the government improved living standards?
• Has unemployment declined?
• Are public institutions functioning?
• Is corruption being controlled?
• Are citizens safe?
• Are healthcare and education improving?
• Are political freedoms protected?
• Is the economy producing opportunities for younger generations?

War can fundamentally change these criteria.

When society is mobilised around an external threat, political performance may increasingly be measured through military strength rather than social welfare. The political leader can therefore transform the central political question from “Are citizens living well?” to “Is the nation sufficiently protected?”

This transformation has profound political consequences.

A government that fails economically may nevertheless claim political success if it can demonstrate military strength. A leader facing corruption allegations may redirect public attention towards national security. A government confronted by domestic opposition may portray its opponents as helping the enemy. The political arena consequently becomes securitised.

In its most extreme form, this creates a political feedback mechanism:

Threat → fear → militarisation → executive power → political polarisation → further confrontation → renewed threat.

The cycle can become self-reinforcing.

This does not mean that leaders necessarily invent every threat. Real threats exist. Armed groups exist. States genuinely attack one another. Terrorism, occupation, civil war, foreign intervention, and geopolitical rivalry are real phenomena. The analytical question is different: how are real threats politically utilised, amplified, institutionalised, and converted into durable sources of political legitimacy?

3. Erdoğan and the Politics of Regional Power

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan provides an important case for examining the relationship between executive power, military policy, and regional ambition.

Turkey's regional policy has increasingly involved military and geopolitical engagement extending beyond its immediate borders. Analysts have described Erdoğan's government as pursuing a more revisionist regional posture, while Turkey has played a significant role in conflicts involving Syria and other neighbouring theatres. (Council on Foreign Relations)

The political significance of such policies extends beyond military objectives.

When a government presents itself as the defender of national sovereignty, religious identity, territorial integrity, or regional influence, foreign confrontation can become integrated into domestic political narratives. Military operations may consequently serve multiple purposes simultaneously: security objectives, geopolitical objectives, electoral mobilisation, nationalist mobilisation, and the projection of state power.

This does not establish that Erdoğan's policies are motivated exclusively—or even primarily—by personal political survival. Such a conclusion would require evidence of individual intent. However, the broader political mechanism is well established: political leaders can derive domestic legitimacy from projecting strength against perceived enemies.

The danger arises when military power becomes an important component of political identity.

Once political legitimacy becomes dependent upon demonstrating strength, compromise can be portrayed as weakness, diplomacy as surrender, and peace as a loss of national prestige.

4. Benjamin Netanyahu, War, and the Question of Legal Accountability

The case of Benjamin Netanyahu demonstrates another dimension of the relationship between political survival and armed conflict.

The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu in November 2024, alleging responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the context of the situation in Palestine. The Court's proceedings must be distinguished from the separate genocide proceedings brought by South Africa against Israel before the International Court of Justice. (ICC Court of Arbitration)

This distinction is essential for serious academic analysis.

The existence of an arrest warrant does not constitute a criminal conviction. Likewise, the ICJ genocide proceedings against Israel do not constitute a criminal prosecution of Netanyahu personally. South Africa's case concerns Israel's obligations under the Genocide Convention as a state. (International Court of Justice API)

Nevertheless, the broader political question remains highly significant.

Where a government is engaged in a prolonged war while its leadership simultaneously faces intense domestic political pressures and serious international legal allegations, military confrontation can become intertwined with political survival. The longer a conflict continues, the more deeply institutions, political coalitions, security structures, and national narratives can become invested in the war.

This produces a dangerous phenomenon: war can become politically self-preserving even when it is socially destructive.

The humanitarian consequences are borne overwhelmingly by civilians, while political elites possess considerably greater capacity to protect themselves from the direct consequences of violence.

This asymmetry is fundamental to understanding modern warfare.

5. Mohammed bin Salman and the Political Economy of Security

The Saudi case demonstrates yet another model.

Mohammed bin Salman has pursued a highly ambitious programme of economic transformation, state centralisation, social reform, international investment, and geopolitical projection. At the same time, Saudi Arabia's regional role has included military involvement in Yemen and a broader struggle for regional influence.

Human Rights Watch has documented serious concerns regarding repression inside Saudi Arabia and the lack of accountability surrounding alleged abuses associated with the Saudi-led war in Yemen. (Human Rights Watch)

The important analytical point is not that Saudi Arabia is identical to Israel or Turkey. It is not. Nor should different political systems be artificially placed into a single category.

Rather, the Saudi case demonstrates how security, economic power, international prestige, military capacity, and political authority can become interconnected.

A state possessing enormous financial resources can simultaneously finance domestic transformation and maintain substantial geopolitical ambitions. The resulting system can make military and economic power mutually reinforcing.

The broader question is therefore whether economic development is directed towards creating human security—or whether economic power increasingly becomes an instrument for projecting state power abroad.

6. The Syrian Case and the Problem of Armed Political Legitimacy

The emergence of Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani, demonstrates the complexity of political transitions emerging from armed conflict.

Movements that originate in warfare often inherit political structures shaped by military organisation, ideological mobilisation, coercion, and survival under extreme conditions. When such movements enter formal political life, a fundamental question emerges:

Can a political order born from violence successfully transition into a system in which political legitimacy is based upon institutions, law, economic development, and public welfare rather than continued confrontation?

This question is broader than the individual leader.

It concerns the institutional inheritance of war.

If political legitimacy continues to depend upon military strength, societies may remain trapped within a cycle in which armed power becomes the principal mechanism for obtaining political authority.

The challenge is therefore not merely to replace one leader with another. It is to replace the political economy of violence with the political economy of peace.

7. When War Becomes Economically Valuable

War does not benefit everyone economically. In fact, its overall economic consequences are frequently devastating.

Nevertheless, war can create concentrated economic gains for particular sectors, companies, governments, investors, commodity producers, and actors positioned to exploit volatility.

The distinction between aggregate social welfare and concentrated private or institutional gains is therefore crucial.

A conflict can impoverish an entire population while simultaneously enriching a limited group.

This is a classic political-economy problem.

The destruction of infrastructure, disruption of energy supplies, interruption of shipping routes, increased defence expenditure, reconstruction requirements, commodity speculation, and financial volatility can generate enormous transfers of wealth.

The international financial consequences of the 2026 Middle East war illustrate this mechanism. The IMF reported that the conflict produced higher energy prices, declining equity prices, rising bond yields, greater volatility, and heightened global financial-stability risks. (IMF)

The World Bank likewise described the conflict as a historic shock to commodity markets, with major consequences for oil and other commodities. (World Bank)

8. Oil, Metals, Currencies, and Stock Markets

The financial consequences of war extend across multiple markets.

8.1 Oil

Oil is perhaps the clearest example.

When military conflict threatens major production facilities, pipelines, shipping routes, or strategic chokepoints, markets price in a geopolitical risk premium.

The Strait of Hormuz is particularly important because a substantial share of global petroleum trade passes through the region. The IMF has documented the enormous disruption caused to global oil markets by the 2026 conflict. (IMF)

Recent market movements have demonstrated how quickly expectations concerning war and peace can affect crude prices. When diplomatic developments suggested a possible reduction in hostilities in August 2026, Brent crude prices fell sharply while equity markets strengthened. (Reuters)

Conversely, renewed military escalation has generated substantial increases in oil prices. (Reuters)

Thus, war does not merely destroy physical infrastructure; it changes the valuation of future energy supplies.

8.2 Metals and Precious Commodities

Gold, silver, platinum, palladium, and industrial metals can also respond to geopolitical uncertainty.

Investors frequently move capital towards assets perceived as defensive or as stores of value during periods of uncertainty. Recent market movements during the Middle East conflict demonstrated substantial volatility in precious metals and other commodities. (Reuters)

However, it is important not to interpret every increase in commodity prices as a direct transfer of money to political leaders. The relationship is considerably more complex.

The important structural point is that conflict creates volatility, and volatility creates opportunities for some participants while imposing costs upon others.

8.3 Currencies

Currencies are also affected.

War can change expectations concerning inflation, interest rates, capital flows, energy imports, trade balances, and sovereign risk. Consequently, exchange rates can respond rapidly to developments on the battlefield.

The relationship between oil shocks and exchange rates is particularly important for energy-importing and energy-exporting countries. IMF research has demonstrated that oil-price shocks can significantly affect external positions and exchange-rate policy. (IMF)

8.4 Stock Markets

Equity markets represent another transmission mechanism.

War can initially produce:

• falling stock prices;
• increased volatility;
• rising defence-sector valuations;
• increased energy-sector revenues;
• changing expectations concerning interest rates;
• capital flight towards perceived safe assets;
• increased sovereign borrowing costs.

The IMF has documented precisely such mechanisms in relation to the 2026 Middle East conflict. (IMF)

The result is a paradox:

the same war that destroys homes and livelihoods can simultaneously create profitable market opportunities for certain economic actors.

That contradiction deserves far greater political and academic attention.

9. From Financial Gains to Military Capacity

The existence of financial gains does not automatically mean that political leaders personally receive the proceeds of war.

That claim would be too simplistic.

The more important phenomenon is institutional.

Higher state revenues, increased foreign investment in strategic sectors, expanded military budgets, increased energy revenues, access to international financing, and strengthened political alliances can provide governments with greater capacity to sustain military operations.

Saudi Aramco, for example, reported a substantial increase in quarterly profit during the 2026 conflict, while the war simultaneously disrupted global oil supplies. (Reuters)

This illustrates the central distinction between private enrichment and state capacity.

A state does not need to transfer war profits directly into the personal bank account of a political leader for conflict to strengthen that leader's political position.

If war increases state revenues or strengthens the government's financial resources, the government may possess greater capacity to:

• purchase weapons;
• finance security institutions;
• maintain military operations;
• subsidise strategic sectors;
• reward political allies;
• fund propaganda;
• influence media ecosystems;
• strengthen patronage networks; and
• resist domestic political pressure.

War can therefore become a mechanism of political reproduction.

10. The Humanitarian Paradox

The most disturbing aspect of this system is that those who bear the greatest costs are usually those with the least political influence.

A political leader can survive a war while living in a protected compound.

A wealthy investor can profit from commodity volatility while a family struggles to pay for fuel.

A defence contractor can increase revenues while a civilian loses a home.

A state can increase military expenditure while schools and hospitals deteriorate.

A political faction can strengthen its electoral position while ordinary citizens bury their children.

This represents the fundamental humanitarian paradox of prolonged warfare:

The people who possess the least power often pay the highest human price for decisions made by those who possess the most power.

The victims are not abstract statistics.

They are parents, children, teachers, doctors, workers, students, elderly people, refugees, and entire communities.

War also produces forms of suffering that do not appear immediately in casualty statistics: psychological trauma, displacement, unemployment, destroyed educational systems, family separation, disability, poverty, loss of cultural heritage, and the erosion of trust between communities.

A war can therefore continue long after the guns become silent.

11. The Psychological and Moral Dimension of Political Violence

It is understandable that leaders who authorise, facilitate, or persist in military campaigns resulting in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians may be described by the public as “psychopathic”, morally disturbed, or profoundly detached from ordinary human empathy. Such descriptions reflect a moral response to the scale of suffering produced by their decisions. When political leaders repeatedly accept the killing of civilians, the destruction of homes, the displacement of families, and the devastation of entire communities as an acceptable cost of pursuing political or military objectives, the question of their psychological and moral relationship to human life cannot simply be dismissed.

This does not require, however, an armchair psychiatric diagnosis. The more significant issue is observable behaviour: the willingness to continue policies of violence despite extensive civilian suffering, the repeated dehumanisation of populations, the justification of collective punishment, the normalisation of mass death, and the refusal to accept meaningful accountability for the consequences of political decisions.

When thousands of innocent people are killed, the matter is no longer merely an abstract question of strategy or national security. It becomes a profound question of human morality and political responsibility. A leader who possesses the authority to stop or substantially reduce violence, yet continues policies that result in large-scale civilian deaths, cannot be evaluated solely according to the rhetoric of national interest. The human consequences of those decisions must form part of the assessment.

The psychological dimension is therefore inseparable from the political and moral dimensions of prolonged violence. Repeated exposure to violence can produce a process of moral normalisation, in which deaths that would ordinarily provoke profound outrage gradually become presented as statistics, collateral damage, or unavoidable necessities. Dehumanising language can further facilitate this process by transforming civilians from individual human beings into an undifferentiated “enemy population”.

This transformation is particularly dangerous when combined with concentrated political power, ideological certainty, personality cults, militarisation, and institutional impunity. Under such conditions, the suffering of civilians can become subordinated to the political objectives of a small ruling elite.

The fundamental question, therefore, is not whether a particular leader can be clinically labelled as psychopathic. It is whether a political system has permitted individuals with enormous coercive power to become sufficiently detached from the human consequences of their decisions that the killing of innocent people can be repeatedly justified, prolonged, or politically exploited.

Where thousands of civilians have been killed, political responsibility cannot end with the declaration that the deaths were unfortunate consequences of war. Leaders and commanders must ultimately be judged according to evidence, law, and independent judicial processes. If credible evidence establishes responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or other serious international crimes, those responsible should face impartial investigation and, where the legal requirements are satisfied, prosecution and imprisonment.

The central humanitarian principle is therefore simple: political authority cannot place human beings above the law merely because they possess the power to wage war. The greater the authority of a political leader, the greater the responsibility to protect civilian life—and the greater the obligation to answer for deliberate or unlawful destruction of that life.

12. Why Prosperity and Security Can Undermine Violent Politics

The central proposition of this article is that comprehensive human welfare is itself a form of political disarmament.

A population that enjoys:

• economic security;
• functioning institutions;
• reliable healthcare;
• quality education;
• employment;
• freedom of expression;
• political participation;
• physical safety;
• independent courts;
• social mobility; and
• a credible future

is less susceptible to political mobilisation through fear.

When citizens have something substantial to lose, they are more likely to demand peace.

When citizens are poor, insecure, politically excluded, and permanently threatened, political entrepreneurs can more easily mobilise anger and fear.

This leads to a fundamental hypothesis:

The stronger human security becomes, the weaker the political utility of permanent war becomes.

If citizens no longer believe that their survival depends upon a single strongman, a military establishment, a religious authority, or a nationalist movement, political leaders lose the ability to monopolise the language of protection.

Peace therefore threatens political systems that depend upon permanent insecurity.

13. The Loss of the “War Card”

Political violence can function as what may be called the war card: the ability to invoke an external enemy whenever domestic political legitimacy becomes threatened.

A government facing economic problems can say:

We are under attack.

A leader facing political opposition can say:

This is a national security threat.

A government accused of corruption can say:

Now is not the time for political division.

A movement losing public support can say:

The enemy is waiting for our weakness.

The war card can therefore postpone accountability.

But if citizens live in genuine peace and prosperity, the effectiveness of this strategy diminishes.

The public can return to ordinary political questions:

Where is the money going?

Why are institutions corrupt?

Why are public services failing?

Why are political freedoms restricted?

Why are leaders not accountable?

Why are people still poor despite enormous national resources?

At that point, political leaders must compete on governance rather than fear.

14. International Law and the End of Impunity

The humanitarian alternative is not revenge.

It is accountability.

If political leaders or military commanders are accused of serious international crimes, the appropriate response is an independent judicial process, not extrajudicial violence.

International criminal law exists precisely because political power cannot be allowed to place individuals permanently beyond legal scrutiny.

The ICC's warrant concerning Netanyahu demonstrates the principle that senior political office does not automatically eliminate the possibility of international criminal accountability. (ICC Court of Arbitration)

The same principle should apply universally.

If a leader from one political camp is held accountable for war crimes, crimes against humanity, or other international crimes, the same legal standards should apply to leaders belonging to another camp.

Selective justice is not genuine justice.

A credible international order must therefore reject the principle that power determines legality.

15. From the Political Economy of War to the Political Economy of Peace

The alternative to militarised politics must be more than a ceasefire.

A ceasefire stops shooting.

A sustainable peace must transform the incentives that make renewed violence politically attractive.

This requires:

1. Independent judicial institutions capable of investigating alleged crimes.
2. Transparent military budgets and mechanisms preventing corruption.
3. Democratic oversight of security institutions.
4. Protection of journalists and civil society.
5. Economic policies centred on human welfare rather than permanent militarisation.
6. Regional diplomatic mechanisms for resolving disputes.
7. International mechanisms for civilian protection.
8. Reconstruction programmes that benefit affected populations rather than only politically connected companies.
9. Transparent commodity and energy markets.
10. Political systems in which governments can be peacefully replaced.

The objective should be to make peace economically, socially, and politically more rewarding than war.

16. The Middle East Needs a New Definition of Power

For decades, regional power has often been measured through military capabilities:

• missiles;
• aircraft;
• armed groups;
• intelligence services;
• defence budgets;
• territorial influence;
• strategic alliances.

A humanitarian conception of power requires a different measurement.

A powerful state should instead be one in which:

• children can attend school safely;
• citizens can criticise their government without fear;
• hospitals function during crises;
• workers can find decent employment;
• women and men have meaningful legal protection;
• courts can prosecute powerful individuals;
• public money is transparent;
• borders are secure;
• minorities are protected;
• and political transitions occur without bloodshed.

Under this definition, human security becomes the highest form of national security.

17. Conclusion

The persistence of political violence in the Middle East cannot be explained by the ambitions of individual leaders alone. Wars emerge from complex combinations of historical grievances, territorial disputes, ideology, state interests, international intervention, economic structures, and institutional failures.

Nevertheless, once conflict becomes entrenched, political systems can develop powerful incentives for its continuation.

Leaders can obtain legitimacy from fear. Governments can expand executive power. Security institutions can acquire greater resources. Political opposition can be delegitimised. Nationalist and religious narratives can become stronger. Economic actors can profit from volatility. Energy revenues can increase under certain circumstances. Defence industries can expand. Financial markets can generate opportunities for investors positioned to exploit instability.

Meanwhile, ordinary people pay the price.

They lose their homes.

They lose their livelihoods.

They lose their education.

They lose their health.

They lose their security.

And, most tragically, they lose people they love.

The fundamental humanitarian question is therefore not simply which leader is right or wrong, nor which state possesses the greater military capability.

The deeper question is:

What kind of political system allows a leader's political survival to become more valuable than the lives, dignity, security, and prosperity of the population?

A society in which citizens enjoy genuine welfare and security presents a fundamental challenge to leaders who rely upon fear, militarisation, and permanent confrontation. When people are secure, educated, prosperous, politically empowered, and legally protected, the ability to mobilise them through endless external enemies becomes weaker.

At that point, political leaders must face the ordinary responsibilities of government.

They must answer for the economy.

They must answer for corruption.

They must answer for human rights.

They must answer for the use of public money.

And, where credible evidence exists of international crimes, they must answer before independent courts.

The ultimate objective should therefore not be to replace one violent political actor with another. It should be to construct institutions in which no individual leader is powerful enough to make war a substitute for governance.

Peace, in this sense, is not merely the absence of war.

It is the creation of political, economic, and legal conditions under which war is no longer an attractive instrument of political survival.

That is the deeper meaning of human security.

And that is ultimately what the peoples of the Middle East deserve: not another generation sacrificed to the ambitions of political elites, but a future in which human life is valued above military prestige, political survival, economic speculation, ideological domination, and the personal interests of those who possess the power to send others to war.